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Abstract: This paper seeks to examine the effect of political regimes on actual fiscal 
redistribution. We first use a simplified theoretical framework which allows us to formalize the 
testable implications of the relevant literature. Subsequently, employing data on Gini coefficients 
before and after taxes and transfers we develop a measure of fiscal redistribution which allows us 
to capture the targeting of government transfers. Then, our empirical analysis examines the 
impact of the political regime on realized fiscal redistribution for a panel of 133 developed and 
developing countries between 1960 and 2010. Our results suggest that dictatorial regimes 
redistribute more than democracies through fiscal policies. Moreover, our analysis suggests that 
the positive impact of the dictatorial regime on fiscal redistribution is mitigating after some years 
of regime’s stability and finally becomes negative. Our empirical findings remain robust across 
several different specifications and estimation techniques. 
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1.  Introduction 
Government policies affect the distribution of income through a wide range of programs, but 
most directly through implemented fiscal redistribution (i.e. cash transfers to households and 
taxes collected from them). Since the political system is a crucial determinant for every 
governmental policy, a large number of theoretical and empirical studies investigate the interplay 
between the political institutions and fiscal redistribution (see Boix, 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et 
al., 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).  
According to a strand of the literature, political institutions concentrating political power 
within a narrow segment of the population (i.e. non-democratic regimes) generate less fiscal 
redistribution and greater inequality, while in contrast democratic regimes redistribute more and 
therefore produce more egalitarian outcomes (see e.g., Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2006).1 Another strand of the literature treats non democratic regimes as revenues maximizers 
(see e.g., Olson, 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996; Wintrobe, 1998). According to this view, the 
objective of a non-elected official is to maximize public revenues and extract from the public 
budget the maximum amount of resources for his private consumption. In such a context, the 
effect of the political regime on fiscal redistribution is ambiguous. This is because increased 
public revenues may not be directed to the poorer segments of the population through transfers, 
since they become private consumption of the non-elected official.  
Starting from Lindert (1994) a large number of empirical studies have tested the 
relationship between democracy and fiscal outcomes. Specifically, a strand of this literature 
employs historical data in order to examine the effect of democratization on government 
spending (e.g., Lindert, 1994; 2004; Boix 2003; Aidt et al., 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2013) and 
taxation (Aidt and Jensen 2009a; 2009b), whereas another strand relies on modern data in order 
to investigate the relationship under consideration (see e.g., Plümper and Martin, 2003; Mulligan 
et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Profeta et al., 2013). Most of these studies conclude that 
democracy exerts a positive and significant impact on government spending and especially to 
1 The driving force behind this result is the mechanism highlighted by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard 
(1981) according to which the lower is the income of the median voter relative to the average income, the higher will be the 
demand for fiscal redistribution. Therefore, since democracy extends the voting franchise to poorer segments of the population 
the distance between the median’s voter and the average income increases, leading to increased demand for redistribution.  
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those government accounts that could be viewed as redistributive (e.g., social spending, health 
and education), as well as on total tax revenues.2  
Having established such a clear cut positive impact of the democratic institutions on the 
level of government spending and tax revenues, it appears to be puzzling that the parallel 
empirical literature investigating the relationship between democracy and income inequality fails 
to provide any straightforward result (see e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2013). Specifically, Scheve and 
Stasavage (2009) suggest that the extension of the voting franchise had no impact on the share of 
national income held by the top one percent whereas Li et al. (1998) verify a negative and 
significant relationship between civil liberties and income inequality. More recently, Acemoglu 
et al. (2013), using an extensive panel dataset of 128 countries, over the period 1960-2010, 
conclude that democracy does not decrease post-tax income inequality although it exerts a 
positive and significant impact on total tax revenues.3 
Contradicting findings could be attributed to the fact that both tax revenues and 
government spending are at best indirect proxies of fiscal redistribution and they present a 
number of shortcomings. More precisely, using tax revenues as a proxy of fiscal redistribution 
does not take into account that non-tax revenues make up a substantial amount of government 
revenues around the world. There is a large theoretical and empirical literature that dates back to 
the pioneering work of Mahdavy (1970) about the functioning of the “rentier state” that 
highlights the importance of revenues coming from natural resources (i.e., state owned oil 
companies) on domestic politics (see e.g., Ross, 1999, 2004; Smith, 2004; Morrison, 2007). Non-
tax revenues obviously increase the available public funds and consequently they affect fiscal 
redistribution (see Morrison, 2007). Thus, it appears to be crucial to employ a measure that takes 
into account non tax revenues in order to capture the real effect of implemented fiscal policy on 
income inequality. Similarly, using government spending, or even specific public spending items 
(e.g. social spending, health expenditures etc), as proxies of fiscal redistribution fails to reflect 
the potential weak targeting of these resources that mitigate their distributional effects. In 
2 To the best of our knowledge the only paper that fails to provide evidence in favor of a positive impact of democracy on 
government spending and taxation is Mulligan et al. (2004). However, according to Acemoglu et al. (2013) this counter finding 
could be attributed to the fact that their econometric analysis relies on cross-section techniques. 
3 Correspondingly, Ross (2006) provides empirical evidence that although democracies spend more money on education and 
health than non-democracies they fail to achieve better results (i.e. lower infant mortality). This failure is attributed to the 
targeting of health benefits towards the middle and the upper income groups of agents. Similarly, Reinikka and Svensson (2004), 
Deolalikar (1995) and Castro et al. (1999) suggest that in many cases increased government spending provide jobs, patronage and 
subsidies to the middle and the upper quintiles instead of being directed to the lower income groups of agents.  
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particular a large strand of the literature examining low income or recently democratized 
countries (see e.g. Robinson and Torvik, 2005; Mani and Mukand, 2007) suggests that elected 
officials deliberately produce public goods that are socially inefficient since they are unable to 
make credible commitments to their supporters. Correspondingly, in dictatorships public funds 
may be used to finance private consumption of the non-elected official -or of some privilege 
groups of agents- and therefore may not be directed to the citizens through public goods (see 
e.g., Olson, 1993; McGuire and Olson 1996; Wintrobe, 1998). For these reasons, government 
spending presents major shortcomings as a proxy of fiscal redistribution and therefore we are in 
need of an output measure able to capture the potential weak targeting of spending accounts.  
The present paper seeks to tackle the above mentioned issues by employing a measure of 
actual fiscal redistribution similar to that employed by Milanovic (2000) and Iversen and Soscise 
(2006). More precisely, in our empirical analysis we apply a measure of actual fiscal 
redistribution that equals to the difference between market income inequality (i.e. Gini 
coefficient before taxes and transfers) and net income inequality (i.e. Gini coefficient after taxes 
and transfers). This measure of fiscal redistribution reflects in a clear-cut way the change in 
income inequality due to taxes and transfers. Moreover, this straightforward output measure 
presents the additional advantage of capturing both the targeting of fiscal policy as well as the 
positive impact of non-tax revenues on fiscal redistribution.  
In the theoretical considerations’ section we develop a simplified theoretical framework 
which allows us to investigate the effect of the political regime on actual fiscal redistribution and 
therefore to formalize the testable implications of the relevant literature. We find that the 
relationship between the political regime and actual fiscal redistribution is a priori ambiguous 
from a theoretical point of view. This is because dictatorial regimes on the one hand rely more 
heavily on taxation compared to democracies, but on the other hand they extract a higher amount 
of resources from the public budget which in turn reduces the amount of resources directed to 
citizens as government transfers. So, the overall effect of the political regime on actual fiscal 
redistribution remains, theoretically unclear. However, our analysis suggests that young (old) 
dictatorships which are characterized by a relatively lower (higher) probability of survival 
redistribute more (less) as compared to democracies. 
 Then, in the empirical section, we investigate the empirical validity of the above 
hypothesized relationships. To carry out our analysis, we employ the Standardized World 
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Income Inequality Database (SWIID) developed by Solt (2009) which provides both pre-tax-
and-transfers and post- tax-and-transfers Gini coefficients for a wide set of countries from 1960 
to 2010. Based on this dataset we develop two straightforward measures of actual fiscal 
redistribution that allow us to infer the extent to which public resources are indeed directed 
towards the poorer segments of the population, or in contrast are transformed to rents for more 
privileged groups of agents. In turn, in a panel dataset of 133 developing and developed 
countries from 1960 to 2010, we investigate whether alternative political institutions affect actual 
fiscal redistribution. Our empirical analysis suggests that dictatorial regimes redistribute more 
than democracies through fiscal policies. Moreover, our results suggest that the positive effect of 
dictatorship on actual fiscal redistribution diminishes from year to year as the dictatorial regime 
consolidates and finally turns out to be negative. These empirical findings are in accordance with 
our theoretical priors illustrating that relatively vulnerable (secure) dictatorships tend to 
redistribute more (less) compared to democracies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the theoretical 
framework and formalizes the testable implications of the relevant literature. Section 3 illustrates 
the data and the econometric techniques employed; Section 4 discusses the empirical results. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main points. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section elaborates on the theoretical link between the political regime and fiscal 
redistribution so as to formalize the testable empirical implications driven by the relevant 
theoretical literature. To this end, we present a simple theoretical framework which allows us to 
examine fiscal redistribution under alternative political regimes. In the case of a democratic 
regime, our theoretical framework builds on the standard model of fiscal redistribution of 
Meltzer and Richard (1981), whereas in the case of a dictatorial regime our analysis follows the 
rationale of the De Luca et al. (2014) model. 
Consider a model of fiscal redistribution where the regime type can either be a 
democracy or a dictatorship. Agents are heterogeneous in their income yi. If the regime is 
democratic, the government determines a nonnegative tax rate  proportional to income in 
order to finance a lump sum transfer (T) which is common for all the citizens. In this case, the 
optimal tax policy is summarized by the tax rate preferred by the median voter (i.e. agent with 
0τ ≥
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the median income (yM)).  If the economy is run by a dictator, then the dictator is determining the 
tax rate of the economy (τ) and a level of extraction (θ) from the public budget that finances his 
personal consumption. In the following sub-sections, we describe the structure of the economy 
under both regimes and we derive the theoretical implications of the political regime on fiscal 
redistribution. 
 
2.1 Fiscal redistribution in a democratic regime 
In the case of a democratic regime, our model builds on the seminal papers of Romer (1975), 
Roberts (1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). More precisely, we consider a society 
consisting of n citizens which are heterogeneous on their income yi. Ordering people from 
poorest to richest, we think of the median person as the person with the median income (yM). 
Moreover, we let  denote average income in this economy, thus, . The political 
system determines a nonnegative tax rate  proportional to income in order to finance a lump 
sum transfer (T) to all the citizens. We also assume that imposing taxes implies distortions and 
therefore a general deadweight cost which is increasing in the level of taxation. In our model, 
these distortions are captured by an aggregate cost coming out of the government budget 
constraint of  when the tax rate is τ.
4 We assume that , 
so that these costs are strictly convex. Hence, the government budget constraint takes the 
following form: 
 
       (1) 
 
All individuals in the society maximize their consumption, which is equal to their post-tax 
income. Using the government budget constraint (1) we have that, when the tax rate is τ, the 
indirect utility of individual i and his post-tax income are: 
 
4 These distortions are generating the so-called “Laffer curve” which is the non monotonic relationship between the tax rate and 
the level of total tax revenues. When the tax rate is low, increasing the tax rate increases tax revenues. However, as the tax rate 
increases, distortions become more severe and eventually tax revenues reach a maximum. After this point further increases in the 
tax rate decrease the total tax revenues since the distortions created by taxation are so high.  
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        (2) 
 
It is straightforward to derive each individual i’s ideal tax rate from this indirect utility-function. 
This is the tax rate that satisfies the following first-order condition: 
 
          (3a) 
 
Equation (3a) implies that poorer (richer) individuals prefer higher (lower) taxation and therefore 
higher (lower) fiscal redistribution. Since preferences over τ are single peaked, the median voter 
theorem applies. Therefore, we conclude that, in a democratic regime, the equilibrium tax rate 
will be the tax rate preferred by the median voter (i.e. the person with the median income (yM)). 
It is straightforward to show that in a democratic regime, the optimal tax rate ( ) is 
determined by the following equation: 
 
         (3b) 
 
Then Appendix A shows that: 
 
Result 1: The tax rate in a democratic regime is summarized by the tax rate that solves (3b). 
This tax rate 0 1demτ< <  is unique and comparative static exercises imply that ( , )dem My yτ τ
− +
=  
 
Thus, the tax rate decreases with median voter income (for given average income) which is the 
standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) result. 
 
Combining (1) and (3b) we get the government transfers in a democratic regime: 
 
( )dem dem demT y C yτ τ= −          (4) 
 
2.2 Fiscal redistribution in a dictatorial regime 
( ) (1 ) ( ( ))i iV y C yτ τ τ τ= − + −
( )iy y C yτ′= −
demτ
(1 ( ))M demy y C τ′= −
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We now extend the analysis to a dictatorial regime so as to compare the outcomes concerning 
fiscal redistribution under both regimes. In a dictatorial regime, the ruler is a self-interested 
leader who extracts resources from the public funds in order to finance his personal 
consumption.  
More precisely, we assume that the non-elected leader chooses the tax rate ( ) imposed 
on income as well as the degree of extraction (θ) from public revenues. By extracting resources, 
the dictator decreases the political support he receives and therefore hurts his probability of 
survival. Following the rationale of the relevant literature (see e.g., De Luca et al., 2014), we 
assume that the dictator faces a survival probability which depends negatively on the 
amount of extracted tax revenues (i.e. ) and positively on the maturity of the regime which 
is denoted as z (i.e. )5. Moreover, we assume that when the dictator does not extract 
resources his probability of survival equals to one (i.e.  for any ). Whereas, on 
the other hand, when he extracts the full amount of the public budget his probability of survival 
is equal to zero (i.e. (1, ) 0p z = for any ). Finally, we assume that the effect of extraction on 
the probability of survival varies with the maturity of the political regime (i.e.   ) and 
that the effect of extraction on the probability of survival is non increasing on the degree of 
extraction (i.e.
2
2 0
p
θ
∂
≤
∂
). 
 
The dictator maximizes his utility as described by: 
 
( , )[ ( ( ) ] (1 ( , ))d dV p z y C y p z Vθ θ τ τ θ= − + −         (5) 
 
where  is the probability of survival, denotes the dictator’s utility when he is out of 
office and R denotes the amount of rents extracted from public revenues for private consumption 
of the dictator which equals to: 
5 Following the rationale of the relevant literature we assume that a dictatorial regime consolidates after some years in power and 
that is more vulnerable during the first years after regime transition.  
dicτ
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          (6) 
 
Since the budget constraint of the dictator is:  we conclude that government 
transfers in a dictatorial regime equal to: 
 
        (7) 
 
Substituting (6) into equation (5) and assuming that 0dV =  we get the following indirect utility 
function of the dictator: 
 
( , )[ ( ( ) ]dV p z y C yθ θ τ τ= −         (8) 
 
It is straightforward to derive the tax rate ( ) and the degree of extraction ( ) from this 
indirect utility-function. These are: (i) the tax rate and (ii) the degree of extraction that satisfy the 
following first-order conditions: 
 
( , ) (1 ( )) 0p z y Cθ θ τ′− =          (9a) 
 
which in turn implies6: 
 
1 ( ) 0C τ′− =           (9b) 
 
 and  
 
[ ( ( ) ] ( , )( ( ) ) 0p y C y p z y C yθ τ τ θ τ τ
θ
∂
− + − =
∂      (10) 
 
6 From equation (8) we get that when θ=1 or θ=0, Vd=0. So neither θ=1(that ensures p(θ,z)=0) nor θ=0 can be optimal solutions 
and therefore p(θ,z)θ has to be different from zero.  
( ( ) )R y C yθ τ τ= −
( ( ) )T R y C yτ τ+ = −
(1 )( ( ) )T y C yθ τ τ= − −
dicτ
*θ
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Then, Appendix A shows:  
 
Result 2: Tax rate in a dictatorial regime is summarized by the tax rate ( dicτ ) that solves (9b). 
This tax rate 0 1dicτ< <  is unique and maximizes public revenues ( ( ))y Cτ τ− .
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Result 3: The degree of extraction from the public funds for private consumption of the dictator 
is summarized by the share of extraction (θ) that solves (10). This share  *0 1θ< <  is unique and 
comparative static exercises imply that * ( )zθ θ
+
= . 
 
Substituting tax rate ( ) and the degree of extraction ( ) into (7), we conclude that transfers 
in a dictatorial regime equals to: 
 
*(1 )[ ( ) ]dic dic dicT y C yθ τ τ= − −        (11) 
 
2.3 Comparing actual fiscal redistribution in democracies and dictatorships 
In this sub-section, we examine the effect of the political regime on fiscal redistribution.  From 
equations (3b) and (9b) we get the tax rates from the democratic and dictatorial regimes, 
respectively. By comparing (3b) and (9b) we can conclude that  always exceeds  which 
in turn ensures that public revenues under dictatorship are always larger than public revenues in 
a democratic regime (i.e. ( ( )) ( ( ))dic dic dem demy C y Cτ τ τ τ− > − ); however, in the case of the 
dictatorial regime a share ( ) of public revenues is not directed to the citizens through transfers 
but instead is becoming private consumption in favor of the dictator. Therefore, in order to 
examine the effect of the political regime on actual fiscal redistribution we have to compare 
equations (4) and (11).  
 
Comparison of (4) and (11) implies that: 
7 Our results are in line with previous studies treating non democratic regimes as revenues maximizers (see e.g., Olson, 1993; 
McGuire and Olson 1996; Wintrobe, 1998). Following the rationale of this literature, we conclude that dictators implement 
government policies that fully exploit available public funds (i.e. they choose to increase tax rates as long as they are on the 
positive sloped side of the Laffer curve). Although in our theoretical model these funds are driven from income taxation the 
theoretical argument can be easily extended to public revenues driven from other resources (i.e. non-tax revenues).  
dicτ
*θ
dicτ demτ
*θ
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 Proposition 1. Given that ( ( )) ( ( ))dic dic dem demy C y Cτ τ τ τ− > − , there is a unique threshold degree 
of extraction *θ θ=   which ensures that government transfers in democracy ( demT ) equal 
government transfers in dictatorship ( dicT ).  
 
Corollary 1. For each degree of extraction  (resp.  ) government transfers in 
democracy ( ) are higher (resp. lower) than government transfers in dictatorship ( ). 
 
Corollary 1 suggests that the relationship between the political regime and actual fiscal 
redistribution is a priori ambiguous. This is because dictatorial regimes on the one hand increase 
public revenues but on the other hand they extract a larger amount of resources from public 
funds which in turn reduces the budget that is directed to the citizens as transfers. Therefore, the 
overall effect of the political regime on actual fiscal redistribution remains from a theoretical 
point of view unclear.  
 
2.4 The effect of dictatorial regime’s maturity on fiscal redistribution 
In this sub-section we examine the effect of the dictatorial regime’s maturity on fiscal 
redistribution. That is, we investigate whether younger dictatorships redistribute more relative to 
older dictatorships and democracies.  
 
Proposition 2. Given the strictly monotonic relationship between  and z, for given level of 
 each level of dictatorial regime’s maturity z corresponds uniquely to a degree of extraction 
. Therefore, there will always be a unique threshold level of dictatorial regime’s maturity 
 that corresponds to the threshold degree of extraction . This threshold level  ensures 
that government transfers in democracy ( demT ) equal government transfers in dictatorship ( dicT ).  
 
Corollary 2. For each level of dictatorial regime’s maturity  (resp. ), the degree of 
extraction is  (resp. ) and therefore the government transfers in a democratic 
political regime ( ) are lower (resp higher) than government transfers in dictatorship( ) 
*θ θ>  *θ θ< 
demT dicT
*θ
dicτ
*θ
z z=  θ z
z z<  z z> 
θ θ<  θ θ> 
demT dicT
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 Corollary 2 suggests that relatively young -and therefore less secure- dictatorships redistribute 
more compared to democracies whereas older and relatively more secure dictatorships 
redistribute less compared to democracies.  
 
3. Empirical Specification and Data. 
 
3.1 The Data  
Our sample consists of an unbalanced panel of data from 1960 to 2010 for a number of countries 
that varies between a minimum of 122 and a maximum of 133, reflecting limitations to data 
availability.8 Explicit definitions, descriptive statistics and sources of the variables employed are 
provided in Appendix B. 
 
3.1.1 Data on fiscal redistribution 
We measure fiscal redistribution (denoted as absolute fiscal redistribution) as the difference in 
Gini coefficient before and after fiscal redistribution (i.e. before and after government transfers 
and taxes).9 This measure allows us to infer the extent to which public resources are indeed 
directed –through transfers- to the poorer segments of the population (therefore achieving a 
reduction in income inequality) instead of being transformed to private consumption of the non-
elected officials. Data on Gini coefficients (both before and after fiscal redistribution) are 
obtained from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) developed by Solt 
(2009).10  
In order to provide some simple descriptive statistics of the variable absolute fiscal 
redistribution, its mean value in our sample is 6.81 (the standard deviation is equal to 6.88), with 
higher values indicating a higher level of fiscal redistribution. Moreover, the descriptive statistics 
reveal that Denmark and Sweden are amongst the countries that achieve the maximum fiscal 
8 Although we begin with all the countries from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, we exclude from our sample 
non-independent territories and very small-states (e.g., Andorra, Monaco, Puerto Rico, Timor-Leste, West Bank and Gaza etc). 
Subsequently, the sample size was restricted by the availability of income inequality data as well as from government 
consumption data for which income inequality data are available. 
9 This measure of fiscal redistribution is identical methodologically to the one developed and employed by Milanovic (2000). 
10 The SWIID maximizes the comparability of income inequality statistics for the largest possible sample of countries and years, 
namely for 173 countries over the period from 1960 to 2010. For the construction of the dataset, Solt (2009) employed a custom 
missing-data algorithm to standardize Gini estimates from all major existing resources of inequality data (e.g., Luxembourg 
Income Study, World Income Inequality database etc). For more details on the methodology and definitions of the SWIID see 
Solt (2009). 
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redistribution over the period examined with values that exceed 25 points, while, in sharp 
contrast, Burkina Faso and Zambia present regressive fiscal redistribution that exceeds in both 
cases -10 points.11  
 
3.1.2 Data on political regime 
For our main explanatory variable of our study, we use the dichotomous coding of regime-type 
data from four different sources. More precisely, we employ the dichotomous variable developed 
by Cheibub et al. (2010, henceforth CGV) that classifies regimes as democratic or dictatorial for 
202 countries over the period 1946 to 2008. The key political factors that CGV takes into account 
in order to codify a period as democratic are: (i) popular elections of the executive and 
legislature, (ii) multiple parties competing in the election and (iii) unconsolidated incumbent 
advantage. We also use the measure developed by Boix et al. (2012, henceforth BMR) that 
provides information about the political regime type for 219 distinct countries from 1800 to 
2007. The BMR dichotomous measure qualify a country as democratic if, in addition to the 
factors that were taken into account by CGV, at least half of the male electorate is enfranchised.12 
Moreover, we include in our analysis the variable developed by Geddes et al. (2014, henceforth 
GWF), which classifies regimes for 156 countries during the period from 1946 to 2010. The 
requirement in the GWF dataset for a country to be coded as democratic includes minimal 
conditions for suffrage and party competition, not included in CGV’s coding, while they do not 
use the CGV’s unconsolidated incumbent advantage rule. Finally, our analysis also relies on the 
dichotomous measure developed by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008, henceforth P&S) that 
includes observations for 174 countries over the period 1960-2005, which subsequently we 
extend until 2010. The definition of P&S builds on the theory of democratization in waves (see 
e.g., Huntington, 1993) and it identifies permanent changes in the democratic status. Hence, 
although the CGV, BMR and GWF measures capture political transitions to democracy as well as 
reversals (i.e. transitions to non-democratic regimes), the P&S measure places the spotlight 
solely on permanent democratization episodes.  
 
11 It is worth noting that Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Peru and Zambia are the only countries in our sample that present significant 
negative values of fiscal redistribution (i.e. regressive fiscal redistribution).In some other cases (e.g., Bangladesh and Colombia) 
the negative values of absolute fiscal redistribution are on average close to zero over the period examined.  
12 It is worth noting that both datasets are different updates and revisions of the well established measure developed by 
Przeworski et al. (2000). 
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3.1.3 Control variables 
To ensure robust econometric identification, in our empirical analysis, we consider a number of 
covariates that are expected to affect absolute fiscal redistribution. In particular, we control for 
the level of economic development by employing the (log of) real GDP per capita (denoted as 
GDP per capita) obtained from the Penn World Tables 8.0 (PWT). Moreover, we control for 
government consumption spending, as a percentage of GDP (denoted as government 
consumption), taken from the World Banks’ World Development Indicators (WDI). Controlling 
for government spending allows us to investigate fiscal redistribution for a given level of 
government spending, which better reflects the targeting of government spending between 
different groups of agents. In addition to the two basic control variables that are included in all 
analyses, later we introduce some additional covariates in order to assess the robustness of our 
results. 
 
3.2 Econometric Model 
To analyse the effect of a dictatorial versus a democratic regime upon fiscal redistribution, we 
formulate the following empirical model: 
 
                            (12)                           
       
where  represents absolute fiscal redistribution, as proxied by the difference between the 
market Gini and the net Gini coefficients, in country i over a three year period. Given that annual 
macroeconomic data are noisy we resort to non-overlapping 3-year averages for the period from 
1960 to 2010 (1960-1962 to 2008-2010).13 To allow for time lags, data for the explanatory 
variables are used in the beginning year of each sub-period (1960, 1963,…2008). Specifically, 
is dummy variable that takes value 1 if a country is categorized as non-democratic 
in country i at time t, according to the CGV, BMR, GWF and P&S dichotomous classification of 
the regime, and 0 otherwise. Moreover,  includes the additional covariates that are expected 
13 Although the cross-country literature often uses five-year averages we choose to employ 3-year averages, because the latter 
choice allows us to have a sufficient number of observations for each cross section and especially for some of the developing 
countries of our sample. Note, however, that results are very similar when we employ 5-year averages.  
ittiitittit XipDictatorshY εδγβα ++++=+ 12,
itY
itpDictatorhi
itX
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to affect absolute fiscal redistribution, and correspond to country and time fixed effects, 
respectively, and  is the error term.  
The model could be dynamic due to the persistence in inequality and fiscal commitments 
that carry over from one year to the next. To capture this persistence, previous empirical studies 
have applied dynamic panel specifications (see e.g., Aidt and Jensen, 2013; Amendola et al., 
2013). Following the rationale of this literature, we include a lagged dependent variable in our 
model estimating the following equation: 
 
                      (13) 
 
We seek a robust method to identify how the regime affects fiscal redistribution. To establish 
baseline results, we estimate equation (12) using ordinary least squares (OLS) with country and 
time fixed effects. We include a full set of country and fixed effects so that our estimates are not 
contaminated by aggregate shocks and trends common to all countries or by time invariant 
country-specific characteristics.  
In order to estimate equation (13), we first rely on a dynamic OLS model with country 
and time fixed effects. However, estimation of equations (12) and (13) via OLS may entail 
several econometric issues. This is because including a lagged dependent variable introduces a 
potential bias by not satisfying the strict exogeneity assumption of the error term εit. As shown in 
the literature, the estimated bias of this formulation is of order 1/T, where T is the time length of 
the panel, even as the number of countries becomes large (see, among others, Nickell, 1981; 
Kiviet, 1995). The average time series length of our panel is below 10 years and the bias is not 
negligible. In order to deal with this econometric problem, we rely on the generalized method of 
moments (GMM) for dynamic panel models, developed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and 
Arellano and Bond (1991).  
The difference-GMM methodology consists in taking first-differences of the equation in 
levels  
 
                  (14) 
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15 
 
where we first difference our dependent variable and the covariates of our model − all measured 
initially in levels, eliminating country specific effects. Although the model given by equation 
(14) solves some major econometric problems, it introduces a correlation between the new error 
term and the lagged dependent variable. To address this issue, Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest 
using the lagged values of the explanatory variables in levels as instruments. Under the 
assumption that the original error term is not serially correlated, the second and further lags of 
the dependent variable and the first and further lags of the variable Dictatorship are used as 
instruments for the lagged dependent variable (see Acemoglu et al., 2013). As Roodman (2009) 
pointed out, using the full set of moments in GMM estimator may lead to the “too many 
instruments” bias, making some asymptotic results about the estimator and related specification 
tests misleading.14 Therefore, in order to limit the number of instruments generated by the GMM 
estimator, we use only certain lags instead of all available lags for instruments.15 
More importantly, one could argue that our results can be contaminated by potential 
reverse causality between the explanatory variables and absolute fiscal redistribution, by the 
measurement error in the alternative dictatorial indices that we use and the potential omitted 
variable bias. To address these issues, first in section 4.2.2, we adopt an alternative specification 
by using for the dependent the last year of each sub-period (1962, 1965,…,2010), instead of the 
3-year average value. This specification allows us to mitigate concerns of endogeneity running 
from the basic control variables, GDP per capita and government consumption to absolute fiscal 
redistribution. Moreover, in section 4.2.5, to deal with this concern we adopt an instrumental 
variables approach. The challenge in our case is to find an instrument that affects absolute fiscal 
redistribution only through its effect on the regime. To do that, we follow an identification 
strategy similar to Aidt and Jensen (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014), where regional diffusion 
effects seem to be an attractive source of exogenous variation for the determination of the 
regime.  
 
14 A valid alternative to the difference-GMM is Blundell and Bond’s (2000) system-GMM estimator, which maintains the 
differenced equation to which it adds an equation in levels with an additional set of instruments. We prefer the difference-GMM 
over the system-GMM estimator for two reasons. First and foremost, because for consistency the system-GMM requires that the 
initial value of the dependent variable is uncorrelated with the unobserved country-specific effects. Given the historically-
determined nature of both democracy and redistribution, this is unlikely to be a good assumption in our case (see Acemoglu et al., 
2013). Second, the additional moment conditions that are generated by the system-GMM estimator, limit even further our choices 
for instruments. 
15 In some of our regressions, the number of instruments marginally exceeds the number of countries. When, however, we limit 
even further the number of lags and therefore the number of instruments employed in our regressions, results remain unaffected.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Baseline Results 
Our baseline results are reported in Tables 1A and 1B. More precisely, Table 1A reports the 
estimates of equation (12) using the data and the empirical methodology described in the 
previous section. In columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) of Table 1A absolute fiscal redistribution is 
regressed on the four alternative measures of Dictatorship, as well as on GDP per capita. In 
order to make our results comparable with previous empirical studies investigating the same 
relationship (see e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2006; Acemoglu et al., 2013), we start our analysis 
without including the variable government consumption in our set of controls.  
 
[Table 1A, here] 
 
As a second step in our analysis, in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) we add in our set of controls 
government consumption. Including government consumption allows us to investigate fiscal 
redistribution for a given level of government spending, which reflects in a better way the 
targeting of government spending between different groups of individuals. As can be seen in all 
alternative specifications presented in columns (1) to (8), Dictatorship bears a positive and 
significant coefficient. This result illustrates that dictatorial regimes are characterized by higher 
fiscal redistribution relative to the democratic ones. More specifically, the estimated coefficients 
of the variable Dictatorship in Table 1A imply an increase in fiscal redistribution that lies 
between 1.2 to 1.8 points. Given that the mean value of absolute fiscal redistribution in the 
sample is 6.9 points (with a standard deviation of 7.1 points), it is clear that this effect is 
quantitatively sizable. This finding appears to be in sharp contrast with previous empirical 
studies employing total tax revenues as a proxy of fiscal redistribution and conclude that 
democratic institutions generate more fiscal redistribution and consequently more egalitarian 
outcomes (see e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2013). One potential explanation for this contradicting 
finding is that our measure of actual fiscal redistribution takes into account the effect of non-tax 
revenues on fiscal redistribution which is different between democracies and dictatorships as 
suggested by Morrison (2007).16 As far as the rest of the covariates are concerned, we observe 
16 Morrison (2007) provides evidence that an increase in the non tax revenues account is associated with less taxation of the elites 
in democracies and more social spending in dictatorships.  
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that the coefficients on both government consumption and GDP per capita are positive and 
significant indicating that countries characterized by higher levels of government spending and 
higher GDP per capita are also characterized by higher fiscal redistribution.  
Moving one step forward, in Table 1B we add the lagged dependent variable into the set 
of controls. In the first four columns of Table 1B, we use the OLS estimator as implemented in 
equation (13). As can be easily verified, all three CGV, BMR and GWF measures of dictatorship 
lose part of their statistical significance, but they retain their positive effect on absolute fiscal 
redistribution. On the contrary, the P&S measure becomes insignificantly related to absolute 
fiscal redistribution. As we have already mentioned, the main difference between the P&S 
measure with the rest that we apply in our estimates, is that the former codes only permanent 
democratization incidents. Hence, if a country has both democratic periods and reversals to 
dictatorial regimes before the permanent democratization, it is coded entirely as dictatorial 
before the permanent transition. As P&S argue this strategy allows them to measure the effects 
of regime transitions more properly, on the hand, while they recognise that their binary measure 
might suffer from misclassification in some countries on the other hand.  
 Another concern for the estimates reported in the first four columns of Table 1B is the 
bias that can be present by the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Hence, in columns (5)-
(8) of Table 1B we estimate equation (14) using the GMM estimator along the lines of Arellano 
and Bond (1991). Once again, the variable Dictatorship enters with a positive and significant 
coefficient in all but the P&S case, and moreover its statistical significance increases 
substantially. Moreover, adding the lagged dependent variable weakens the effect of GDP per 
capita that remains statistically significant only in 2 out of 8 specifications, while government 
consumption retain its significance only in the OLS regressions.  
 
[Table 1B, here] 
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of the assumption of no 
serial correlation in the error term (i.e. no second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
idiosyncratic errors) and on the validity of the instruments. The Arellano–Bond test of second 
order serial correlation indicates that there is second-order serial correlation among the 
differenced residuals and the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions suggests that our 
18 
 
instruments are valid. Hence, although in columns (1) to (8) the lagged absolute fiscal 
redistribution is highly significant in all alternative specifications, illustrating that there is a 
considerable degree of persistence in the redistributive mechanisms, the positive relationship 
between the variables Dictatorship and absolute fiscal redistribution remains unaffected in 3 out 
of 4 specifications under this alternative setup.  
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
In this sub-section, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline empirical findings presented in 
Tables 1A and 1B. To this end, we re-estimate the previous equations under various 
modifications. First, we re-estimate equations (12) and (14) by employing a different dependent 
variable. More precisely, we use the percentage change between the market Gini and the net Gini 
coefficients instead of their first difference. Second, we adopt an alternative specification by 
using for the dependent variable the last year of each sub-period of our sample, instead of the 
average value for the whole sub-period. Third, we re-estimate equations (12) and (14) by 
employing an extensive set of covariates in our specification. Fourth, we repeat regressions to 
ensure that the results of Table 3 are not influenced by outlier observations. Finally, we take an 
instrumental variables approach in order to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns about our 
results.  
 
4.2.1 Alternative dependent variable 
In Table 2, we inquire into the robustness of our results by investigating whether our empirical 
findings are driven by the specific measure of fiscal redistribution we have employed so far. To 
this end, in Table 2 we use as dependent variable the percentage change of Gini coefficients 
before and after fiscal redistribution (i.e. before and after transfers and taxes).17 More precisely, 
the formula employed in order to construct relative fiscal redistribution is as follows: 
 
                         (15) 
 
17 A similar measure of fiscal redistribution has also been applied by Iversen and Soskice (2006). 
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Hence, in Table 2, relative fiscal redistribution is regressed on our core set of controls. More 
precisely, in columns (1), (3), (5) and (7), we replicate the OLS estimates presented in columns 
(2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 1A, whereas  in Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8)  we replicate the 
GMM estimates presented in Columns (5) to (8) of Table 1B. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
As can be easily verified, Dictatorship enters again with a positive and significant coefficient in 
most alternative specifications. These results are in accordance with our previous findings, 
illustrating that dictatorial countries are characterized by higher actual fiscal redistribution 
relative to the democratic ones. As far as the rest of the covariates are concerned our results 
remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Tables 1A and 1B.  
 
 
 
4.2.2 Alternative specification 
As already mentioned, one could argue that our results are contaminated by potential reverse 
causality between the explanatory variables and absolute fiscal redistribution. In order to 
mitigate these concerns, we modify equation (12) (and all the rest after) in the following way: 
 
                           (16)                           
 
where we use for the dependent variable the last year of each sub-period (1962, 1965,…,2010), 
instead of the average, while for the explanatory variables we keep on taking the first year of 
each sub-period (1960, 1963,…,2008) (see also Acemoglu et al., 2013). It is worth noting that 
when we conduct the IV analysis in section 4.2.5., apart from the original specification presented 
in section 3.2 we also use the modified one of this section. Moreover, this specification allows us 
to assess if the inclusion of the lagged dependent on the right-hand side of equations (13) and 
(14) induces complex patterns of serial correlation that affects our results. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
ittiititit XipDictatorshaY εδγβ ++++=+ 12
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 In Table 3, we follow the same strategy as we did in Table 2, by replicating the OLS estimates 
presented in columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) of Table 1A, and the GMM estimates presented in 
columns (5) to (8) presented in Tables 1B. As can be seen, once again Dictatorship enters with a 
positive and significant coefficient in all but the P&S case in the dynamic specification of 
column (8), whereas for the variables GDP per capita and government consumption results 
remain qualitatively identical to those presented in Tables 1A and 1B.  
 
4.2.3. Adding control Variables 
In Table 4, we inquire into the robustness of our baseline results by investigating whether the 
positive impact of Dictatorship on fiscal redistribution survives when we add control variables to 
the estimated equations. However, it is worth mentioning that not many previous studies have 
attempted to model absolute fiscal redistribution as we define it, making it a quite difficult task 
to find appropriate control variables for our specification. Therefore, we experiment with several 
control variables that intuitively are considered to be important determinants of fiscal 
redistribution. More specifically, in addition to GDP per capita, we use as a measure of 
economic development the annual percentage change of GDP per capita (denoted as growth), 
obtained from the PWT. Moreover, we include in our analysis the following variables obtained 
from World Bank's WDI. We use the dependency ratio of the population (denoted as age 
dependency) that is measured as the percentage of the population younger than 15 years or older 
than 64 to the number of people of working age between 15 and 64 years. This variable allows us 
to control for demographic influences on the structure of social spending and fiscal redistribution 
(see, e.g., Galasso and Profeta, 2004; von Weizsacker, 1996). The next control is population 
density (denoted as age population density) defined as the population divided by land area in 
square kilometers. A larger share of population density ensures economies of scale in the 
provision of the public good and therefore higher actual fiscal redistribution for a given level of 
spending (see e.g., Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998). Finally, we control for the effects of 
international market integration by including the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP (denoted 
as openness) in order to account for the effects of globalization on the structure of fiscal 
redistribution (see e.g., Rodrik, 1997; 1998). 
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[Table 4 here] 
 
To this end, in Table 4 we re-estimate the static OLS and GMM regressions presented in Tables 
1A and 1B, by extending our set of covariates to include the above mentioned controls. As can 
be seen, qualitative results regarding the variable Dictatorship remain in line with those depicted 
in Tables 1A and 1B. Moreover, the variable growth is statistically insignificant in all but one 
case, in which it appears to be positive and significantly related to absolute fiscal redistribution. 
The variable openness appears to be statistically insignificant in all regressions. On the other 
hand, the variable population density bears a positive significant coefficient in most of the 
specifications which is in accordance with our theoretical priors. Finally, the variable age 
dependency has the expected positive effect on fiscal redistribution, but only in the OLS 
regressions. 18 
 
4.2.4. Testing for outliers 
As a next step, in order to ensure that our results are not driven by extreme values, we explore 
the sensitivity of our basic findings to outlier observations. Therefore, in Table 5A, we re-
estimate our benchmark specification without countries with a standardized residual above 2.576 
or below -2.576.19 When we repeat the regressions without the identified outlier observations, we 
drop up to 25% of our sample. Then, in Table 5B we proceed by excluding the ex-Soviet Union 
countries. In this group of countries the collapse of the regime came simultaneously with a 
collapse in the centrally planned economic system. Given that the profound restructuring of these 
countries’ societies and economies during the democratization that is probably in comparison to 
other democratizations observed in our sample, we attempt to assess the importance of this group 
of countries for our results.20  
18 It should be mentioned that we have attempted to include in our model a series of other control variables, such as the squared 
term of GDP per capita to test for a hump-shaped relation between economic development and fiscal redistribution, indices of 
educational attainment to control for the level human capital, an index of the intensity of foreign wars, the urbanisation rate and 
the growth rate of the population. However, none of these variables had a significant effect on absolute fiscal redistribution, and 
due to other concerns as well (correlation of control variables, reduction of sample size), we do not include them in our 
estimations. Results are available upon request 
19 Two points are worth noting here. First, we prefer this cut-off point, instead of the standard textbook way where standardized 
residuals have an absolute value greater than 3 (see, e.g., Maddala, 2001), in order to ensure further the precision of our results. 
Second, when alternatively we drop countries with a Cook’s distance above the rule of thumb value of 4 over the number of 
observations, results, available upon request, remain unaffected. 
20 An additional concern for our results might be the precision of the estimation of the absolute fiscal redistribution measure for 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries. When we exclude this group of countries, the positive effect of the variable Dictatorship on fiscal 
redistribution becomes even stronger. Results available upon request.  
22 
 
                                                 
 [Table 5A and 5B here] 
 
As can be seen, our empirical findings, presented in Tables 5A and 5B, are qualitatively identical 
to those presented in previous Tables confirming the positive impact of dictatorial regimes on 
absolute fiscal redistribution. Moreover, as expected, the R- squared of the estimated equations 
has significantly improved by the exclusion of the outliers.   
 
4.2.5 The 2SLS identification strategy 
The empirical strategy with the lagged dependent variable on the right hand side of the estimated 
equation, in addition to the full set of country and time fixed effects, rules out certain types of 
contaminating factors for our results. However, one could still argue that our results can be 
affected by potential reverse causality from fiscal redistribution to the political regime, by the 
measurement error of the alternative regime-type measures that we use and the potential omitted 
variable bias. To deal with these issues, in this sub-section, we proceed by applying a 2SLS 
identification strategy.  
The challenge is to find an instrument that is adequately correlated with the regime within 
the country, while it remains uncorrelated with the unobserved time-varying component that 
affects fiscal redistribution. In other words, we need a variable that affects fiscal redistribution 
only through its effect on the regime within the country. Following the rationale of the 
“democratization in waves” developed by Huntington (1993) as well as the “democratic capital” 
theory of Persson and Tabellini (2009), we conclude that regional democratic diffusion appears 
to be an attractive source of exogenous variation in the determination of the domestic regime.21 
To this end, we develop the variable Democracy abroad for country i in year t as follows:  
 
                                                             (19) 
 
where, Djt is a dummy variable that takes the value one if, according to the P&S measure, 
country j (different from i) is classified as democratic and 0 otherwise, whereas Wij is the inverse 
21 Aidt and Jensen (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) employed a similar identification strategy in order to overcome the 
aforementioned econometric issues. 
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distance in kilometres between the capitals of country i and j. It must be noted that the P&S 
measure is ideal for our purpose since this variable has been developed based on the notion of 
democratic waves and therefore captures solely robust democratic diffusion and ignores brief 
democratic spikes.  
Since instrumented variable Dictatorship is a binary indicator, we opt for using procedure 
18.1 as suggested by Wooldridge (2002).22 More precisely, we first estimate a probit model for 
each one of the four alternative endogenous variables Dictatorship, on Democracy Abroad, on 
the control variables and on the time fixed effects. In turn, we obtain the fitted probabilities 
(denoted as Dictatorship-hat).23 Finally, we apply the 2SLS estimator using Dictatorship-hat as 
an instrument for Dictatorship, in a just-identified system, to estimate the specifications 
described in section 3.2. and 4.2.2. As already mentioned in our basic specification, described in 
section 3.2, we use the average value of the dependent variable for each sub-period (1960-
62,…,2008-2010) and the first year of each sub-period for the controls (1960,…2008). On the 
other hand, in the alternative specification described in section 4.2.2, we deviate by using only 
the last year of each sub-period (1962,...2010) for the dependent variable. The latter 
specification, where all controls enter with a lag, helps to mitigate concerns of endogeneity for 
the variables GDP per capita and government consumption. 
The results from the 2SLS estimates are reported in Tables 6A and 6B. The first-stage 
results are reported in the lower part of the Tables. As expected, the estimated coefficient of 
Dictatorship-hat is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, the 
consistency of the 2SLS model requires that the instrument Dictatorship-hat is strong enough 
and valid to predict the endogenous variable Dictatorship. For this reason, first we refer to the 
first stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument. According to Staiger and Stock (1997), the first 
stage F-statistic should be at least 10 for weak identification not to be a problem. Moreover, 
Stock and Yogo (2005) argue that for one exogenous instrument, the first-stage F-statistic must 
exceed 8.96 for the 2SLS inference to be reliable. The F-test statistic for the relevance of 
Dictatorship-hat in explaining Dictatorship is in most of our estimates is substantially above 10, 
or at worst marginally below 10, suggesting sufficient first-stage power. Second, we use the 
22 For more details see Wooldridge (2002) sections 6.1.1 and 18.4.1. 
23 Two points are worth noting here. First, we do not include country fixed effects in the probit model in order to avoid the well-
known incidental parameter problem (see e.g., Neyman and Scott, 1948). Second, the variable Democracy abroad is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and has the expected sign. Results available upon request.    
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Kleibergen-Paap weak identification test (see Kleibergen and Paap, 2006) in order to verify that 
Dictatorship abroad is sufficiently correlated with the endogenous variable. As can be seen in all 
estimations, the null of no underidentification cannot be accepted. Hence, all results reported 
suggest a reasonable first-stage fit. 
The results reported in Tables 6A and 6B reveal that 2SLS coefficients are substantially 
larger than those from the OLS estimation. We interpret the larger coefficients in the 2SLS 
estimates as a possible measurement error problem in the right hand side endogenous variable, 
which leads to an attenuation bias in the OLS estimates (see Angrist and Krueger, 1999). As can 
be seen, all estimates in both Tables, in the static and the dynamic specifications, verify the 
positive effect of the variable Dictatorship of absolute fiscal redistribution. Interestingly enough, 
the P&S dichotomous measure of Dictatorship that in the previous Tables appeared to be 
insignificant in the dynamic specification, retains its significance in column 8 of Tables 6A and 
6B when the lagged dependent variable is included in the specification.   
 
 
 
4.3 The Effect of Regime’s maturity on fiscal redistribution 
Our theoretical priors presented in Section 2 suggest that the relationship between the regime and 
fiscal redistribution is a priori ambiguous. This is because, dictatorial regimes on the one hand 
rely heavier on taxation and therefore increase public revenues but on the other hand they extract 
a larger amount of resources from public funds which in turn reduces the amount of public funds 
directed to the citizens as transfers. Therefore, the overall effect of the political regime on actual 
fiscal redistribution remains from a theoretical point of view unclear [see Corollary 1]. However, 
our theoretical priors also suggest that relatively young, and therefore less secure, dictatorships 
redistribute more compared to democracies whereas older and relatively more secure 
dictatorships redistribute less compared to democracies [see Corollary 2].  
In this sub-section, we place the spotlight on the theoretical priors driven from Corollary 
2 and we therefore seek to investigate the effect of a regime’s maturity on the relationship 
between the variable Dictatorship and actual fiscal redistribution.24 To this end, we modify 
equation (12) (and all the rest after) in the following way: 
24 The underlying assumption is that relatively young dictatorships are fragile and face lower probability of survival, whereas 
after some years in power they consolidate through the removal of opponents, societal penetration, and the therefore the 
probability of survival for the dictator increases 
25 
 
                                                 
             (20) 
 
where the variable age of the regime enters in equation (20), on its own and interacted with the 
variable Dictatorship. By introducing this interaction term we allow the effect of Dictatorship to 
be different across countries that are characterized by relatively fragile regimes (i.e. young 
dictatorships), and different within the same country after some years of continuation of the 
regime that implies consolidation. 
To measure the age of the regime we develop three alternative variables. First, we use 
from the CGV and BMR datasets the variable that counts the consecutive years the country has 
been democratic, or non-democratic respectively, according to the classification of their 
dichotomous measure (denoted as age of the regime). Moreover, from the CGV and GWF 
datasets we use the variable that identifies the consecutive years in which the same dictatorial 
regime has been in power, while as before the ageing of the democratic regime is treated 
homogenously (denoted as age of the regime_2).25 Finally, from the CGV dataset, we construct a 
more detailed measure, which identifies the consecutive years in which the same dictator has 
been in power, while the duration of the democratic regime is treated homogenously irrespective 
of whether we had a change in the elected official (denoted as age of the regime_3).26 The results 
of this experiment are presented in Table 7. It is worth noting that for each specification, we 
adopt the static OLS, the dynamic OLS and the GMM estimators in order to check the robustness 
of our results. 
 
[Table 7, here] 
  
As can be seen, once again, the variable Dictatorship bears a positive and significant 
coefficient in all alternative specifications. Moreover, the different definitions we use to capture 
the age of the regime have a positive, though not robust, effect on absolute fiscal redistribution. 
25 In CGV the different types of dictatorial regimes are the civilian dictatorship, the military dictatorship and the royal 
dictatorship. In GWF, respectively, the four different types are the party-based dictatorship, the military dictatorship, the 
personalist dictatorship and the monarchical dictatorship.  
26 Unfortunately, the P&S dataset does not contain a similar variable. 
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As far as the rest of the covariates are concerned, our findings remain comparable to those 
presented in the previous Tables. Moreover, in columns (1)-(3) and (10)-(12) of Table 7A that 
we interact the variable Dictatorship with the variable age of the regime, we find a negative and 
significant effect on absolute fiscal redistribution across all estimates. This empirical finding 
suggests that although dictatorial institutions exert a clear cut positive impact on actual fiscal 
redistribution, this positive effect diminishes from year to year as the dictatorship consolidates. 
In columns (4)-(6) and (13)-(15) that we follow the consecutive years in which the same 
dictatorial regime has been in power on the one hand and the maturity of the democratic regime 
on the other, as captured by the variable age of the regime_2, once again the interaction term 
bears a negative and statistically significant effect on absolute fiscal redistribution. Finally, in 
columns (7)-(9) that we follow the consecutive years in which the same dictator has been in 
power, as captured by variable age of the regime_3, the coefficient of the interaction term is 
negative with an even stronger effect on absolute fiscal redistribution. Using the estimated 
coefficients of Table 7, for all the alternative measures we apply to capture the maturity of the 
regime, the derivative of the variable absolute fiscal redistribution with respect to the variable 
Dictatorship turns out to be negative after 13 to 21 years of a continued dictatorship. The mean 
value of the different measures we apply to capture the maturity of the dictatorial regime lies 
between 11 and 38 years. The lowest value of 11 years is associated with the variable age of the 
regime_3 that we follow the term of specific dictators, while the value of 38 years is associated 
with the variable age of the regime that we follow the regime when a country is characterised as 
dictatorial.27 Hence, it seems that our estimated coefficients represent plausible scenarios where 
after 13 to 21 years that the dictatorial regime consolidates its further continuation shifts the 
effect on fiscal redistribution from positive to negative. 
The empirical findings are in accordance with the theoretical priors driven by Corollary 2. 
Namely, relatively young, and therefore less secure, dictatorships redistribute more compared to 
democracies whereas older and relatively more secure dictatorships redistribute less compared to 
democracies. This is because, according to our theoretical priors, as the dictatorial regime 
consolidates, a larger amount of resources are extracted from public funds in order to finance the 
27 These statistics are not significantly affected even when we drop from our sample some of the most long-standing dictatorships 
that are concentrated in the Northern Africa and the Middle East.  
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private consumption of the non-elected leader and therefore are not directed to the citizens 
through transfers. 
 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we first specify a simple theoretical framework which allows us to investigate the 
relationship between the political regime and fiscal redistribution and whether this relationship 
depends on the probability of survival of the non-elected official. Then, our empirical analysis 
examines the impact of the political regime on fiscal redistribution for a panel of 133 developed 
and developing countries between 1960 and 2010. Backed by strong empirical results, obtained 
from several different specifications and sensitivity analyses, we contend that dictatorial regimes 
are characterized by higher fiscal redistribution relative to the democratic ones. Moreover, our 
analysis suggests that the positive impact of dictatorship on fiscal redistribution declines from 
year to year as the dictatorial regime consolidates and finally turns out to be negative. In other 
words, our empirical findings indicate that older (younger) dictatorships redistribute more (less) 
as compared to democracies 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the relationship between 
the political regime and fiscal redistribution by employing a measure of actual fiscal 
redistribution. In this sense, our findings contribute to the well-established agenda studying the 
interplay between political institutions and fiscal redistribution (see Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006; Aidt and Jensen, 2013). More precisely, we provide a potential explanation for 
why democratic regimes fail to reduce post-tax income inequality, although they increase total 
tax revenues as a share of GDP (see e.g., Scheve and Stasavage, 2009; Acemoglu et al., 2013). 
However, these findings and their potential policy implications call for a deeper understanding of 
the inter- and intra-country mechanisms that create this pattern and this is an issue that definitely 
warrants future research. 
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Appendix A:  
 
Tax rate in a democratic regime 
 
The optimal tax rate in a democratic regime is summarized by the tax rate that solves (3b). This 
tax rate 0 1demτ< <  is unique and comparative static exercises imply that ( , )dem My yτ τ
− +
= . 
 
Proof.  
 
Since ( ) 0C τ′′ > , ( )C τ′ is strictly increasing and therefore tax rate that solves equation (3b) is 
unique.  
 
Consider equation (3b). Applying the implicit function theorem we get: 
 
(1 ( ))
( )
dem dem
dem
C
y yC
τ τ
τ
′∂ − −
=
′′∂ −
which is always positive. Also, 1
( )
dem
M demy yC
τ
τ
∂
=
′′∂ −
which is always 
negative 
 
 
Tax rate in a dictatorial regime 
 
Tax rate in a dictatorial regime is summarized by the tax rate ( dicτ ) that solves (9). This tax rate
0 1dicτ< <  is unique and moreover it the one that maximizes public revenues ( ( ))y Cτ τ− .   
 
Proof.  
 
Since ( ) 0C τ′′ > , ( )C τ′ is strictly increasing and therefore tax rate that solves equation (9b) is 
unique 
 
 
Degree of extraction in a dictatorial regime 
The degree of extraction from the public funds for private consumption of the dictator is 
summarized by the share of extraction (θ) that solves (10). This share  *0 1θ< <  is unique and 
comparative static exercises imply that * ( )zθ θ
+
= . 
 
Proof.  
From equation (10) we get ( , )( ( ) ) [ ( ( ) ]pp z y C y y C yθ τ τ θ τ τ
θ
∂
− = − −
∂
 . Define the left hand side 
as ( , )( ( ) )LHS p z y C yθ τ τ≡ − and the right hand side as [ ( ( ) ]pRHS y C yθ τ τ
θ
∂
≡ − −
∂
.  
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Then, ( ( ) ) 0pLHS y C yθ τ τθ
∂
≡ − <
∂
 and 
2
2 [ ( ( ) ] [( ( ) ] 0
p pRHS y C y y C yθ θ τ τ τ τθ θ
 ∂ ∂
≡ − − + − > ∂ ∂ 
 
 
Thus, assuming existence of a θ that solves equation (10), this *θ θ= is unique. 
 
 
Consider equation (10). Applying the implicit function theorem we get: 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
2
*
2
2
( ( )) ( ( ))
( ( )) 2 ( ( ))
p py C y C
z z
p pz y C y C
θ τ τ τ τθ θ
θ τ τ τ τ
θ θ
∂ ∂
− + −∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= −
∂ ∂∂ − + −
∂ ∂
which is always positive. 
 
 
Proposition 1. Given that ( ( )) ( ( ))dic dic dem demy C y Cτ τ τ τ− > − , there is a unique threshold  level 
of extraction *θ θ=   such that government transfers in democracy ( demT ) equal government 
transfers in dictatorship ( dicT ). 
 
Proof.  
 
We know that ( ( )) ( ( ))dic dic dem demy C y Cτ τ τ τ− > − .  
 
Moreover from equations (4) and (11) we get that ( )dem dem demT y C yτ τ= −  and 
*(1 )[ ( ) ]dic dic dicT y C yθ τ τ= − − .  
 
Since 
* 1
lim 0dicT
θ →
=  that is strictly lower than demT for each demτ >0, and * 0lim ( ( ))dic dic dicT y Cθ τ τ→ = −
that is strictly greater than demT  for each demτ >0 and dicτ >0, there will always be a threshold  
level of extraction *θ θ=  , 0 1θ< <  such that government transfers in democracy ( demT ) equal 
government transfers in dictatorship ( dicT ). 
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Appendix B: Definitions, data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Obs. Mean SD Min Max Source 
absolute fiscal 
redistribution 
Difference of Gini coefficients before 
and after the fiscal redistribution (i.e. 
before and after transfers and taxes) 
1510 6.865 7.060 -11.217 30.394 Solt (2009), Standardized 
World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID). 
relative fiscal 
redistribution 
Percentage change of Gini coefficients 
before and after the fiscal redistribution 
(i.e. before and after transfers and taxes) 
1510 15.009 14.852 -23.438 57.903 SWIID 
Dictatorship 
(CGV) 
Dummy variable that equals to one 
whenever a political regime is 
characterized as dictatorial and 0 
otherwise 
1504 0.428 0.495 0 1 Cheibub et al. (2010) 
Dictatorship 
(BMR) 
Dummy variable that equals to one 
whenever a political regime is 
characterized as dictatorial and 0 
otherwise 
1439 0.440 0.497 0 1 Boix et al. (2013) 
Dictatorship 
(GWF) 
Dummy variable that equals to one 
whenever a political regime is 
characterized as dictatorial and 0 
otherwise 
1403 0.458 0.498 0 1 Geddes et al. (2014) 
Dictatorship 
(P&S) 
Dummy variable that equals to one 
whenever a political regime is 
characterized as dictatorial and 0 
otherwise 
1478 0.420 0.494 0 1 Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008) 
Democracy 
abroad (P&S) 
Measure of democratic diffusion from 
abroad as defined in section 4.2.5 
1507 0.387 0.225 0 0.842 Papaioannou and 
Siourounis (2008) 
age of the 
regime (CGV) 
Age in years of the current regime as 
classified by Dictatorship (CGV) 
1507 35.005 33.562 1 139 Cheibub et al. (2010) 
age of the 
regime_2 (CGV) 
Age in years in which the same 
dictatorial regime has been in power, 
while the ageing of the democratic 
regime is treated homogenously. 
1504 29.559 30.448 1 139 Cheibub et al. (2010) 
age of the 
regime_3 (CGV) 
Age in years in which the same dictator 
has been in power, while the ageing of 
the democratic regime is treated 
homogenously 
1504 25.702 30.820 1 139 Cheibub et al. (2010) 
age of the 
regime (BMR) 
Age in years of the current regime as 
classified by Dictatorship Dictatorship 
(BMR) 
1439 39.942 44.000 1 206 Boix et al. (2013) 
age of the 
regime_3 
(GWF) 
Age in years in which the same 
dictatorial regime has been in power, 
while the ageing of the democratic 
regime is treated homogenously 
1403 30.088 30.962 1 138 Geddes et al. (2014) 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita 1422 8.582 1.183 5.151 10.984 Penn World tables 8.0 
(PWT) 
government 
consumption  
 
Government Consumption as a share of 
GDP (%) 
1363 15.231 5.722 3.135 43.479 World Banks’ World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) (2013) 
growth rate Growth rate of real GDP per capita 1417 2.457 7.667 -59.525 89.916 PWT 
age dependency Share of the population younger than 15 
years or older than 64 to the number of 
people of working age (%) 
1494 69.983 19.205 36.341 120.815 World Banks’ World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
population 
density 
Population divided by land area in square 
kilometers 
1437 152.451 491.719 1.185 6913.430 WDI 
openness International trade volume as a share of 
GDP (%). 
1376 72.305 48.257 6.613 460.471 WDI 
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Table 1A. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Baseline Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
Dictatorship 1.573** 1.780** 1.083* 1.242** 1.500** 1.811*** 1.700** 1.783** 
 (0.716) (0.693) (0.622) (0.598) (0.610) (0.582) (0.756) (0.742) 
         
GDP per capita 2.423*** 2.194*** 2.549*** 2.319*** 2.479*** 2.225** 2.372*** 2.138*** 
 (0.820) (0.804) (0.857) (0.843) (0.880) (0.852) (0.803) (0.790) 
         
government consumption  - 0.173*** - 0.170*** - 0.203*** - 0.173*** 
  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.062)  (0.058) 
R2 0.785 0.789 0.780 0.784 0.785 0.790 0.792 0.796 
Observations 1320 1320 1258 1258 1233 1233 1312 1312 
Number of countries 133 133 132 132 122 122 132 132 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). Robust standard errors, clustered by country are reported 
in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 
5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1B. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Dynamic specification 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV BMR GWF P&S CGV BMR GWF P&S 
absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 0.621*** 0.608*** 0.615*** 0.620*** 0.458*** 0.469*** 0.419*** 0.416*** 
 (0.039) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.120) (0.120) (0.120) (0.109) 
         
Dictatorship 0.971** 0.586* 0.628* 0.471 1.984*** 1.700*** 2.036*** 0.922 
 (0.421) (0.357) (0.343) (0.355) (0.738) (0.649) (0.721) (0.835) 
         
GDP per capita 0.720* 0.806* 0.650 0.682 -0.153 -0.064 -0.460 -0.085 
 (0.406) (0.425) (0.432) (0.421) (0.556) (0.598) (0.566) (0.546) 
         
government consumption 0.077** 0.076** 0.085** 0.069** 0.021 0.024 0.056 0.024 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036) 
R2 0.896 0.889 0.894 0.895 - - - - 
Observations 1188 1126 1116 1182 1039 978 979 1035 
Number of countries 132 131 121 131 132 131 121 130 
Number of instruments - - - - 118 126 123 122 
Hansen (p-value) - - - - 0.268 0.395 0.554 0.298 
AR(2) (p-value) - - - - 0.762 0.627 0.759 0.630 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). OLS regressions include a full set of country and year 
fixed effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimates include time fixed effects (country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The 
absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order lags, while GDP per capita and government 
consumption are considered as exogenous. The Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial 
correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 2. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Alternative Dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
relative fiscal redistribution ratiot-1 - 0.489*** - 0.493*** - 0.430*** - 0.431*** 
  (0.114)  (0.116)  (0.111)  (0.096) 
         
Dictatorship 2.840** 3.260** 2.062** 2.568** 3.109*** 3.363*** 2.855** 1.170 
 (1.165) (1.286) (0.985) (1.184) (0.982) (1.288) (1.230) (1.473) 
         
GDP per capita 3.762*** -0.596 3.984*** -0.444 3.743*** -1.239 3.652*** -0.498 
 (1.328) (1.051) (1.390) (1.144) (1.398) (1.073) (1.307) (1.071) 
         
government consumption 0.297*** 0.032 0.295*** 0.035 0.349*** 0.104 0.297*** 0.042 
 (0.092) (0.069) (0.095) (0.069) (0.098) (0.072) (0.091) (0.068) 
R2 0.866 - 0.863 - 0.868 - 0.870 - 
Observations 1320 1039 1258 978 1233 979 1312 1035 
Number of countries 133 132 132 131 122 121 132 130 
Number of instruments - 118 - 126 - 123 - 122 
Hansen (p-value) - 0.488 - 0.250 - 0.478 - 0.341 
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.373 - 0.419 - 0.497 - 0.365 
Notes: Dependent variable: relative fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 4.2.1). OLS regressions include a full set of country and year fixed 
effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimates include time fixed effects (country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The 
relative fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order lags, while GDP per capita and government 
consumption are considered as exogenous. The Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial 
correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
Table 3. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Alternative Specification. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.320*** - 0.334*** - 0.304*** - 0.370*** 
  (0.107)  (0.111)  (0.111)  (0.098) 
         
Dictatorship 2.086*** 2.786*** 1.579** 1.767** 1.897*** 1.845** 1.696** 0.648 
 (0.740) (0.916) (0.625) (0.817) (0.589) (0.914) (0.703) (0.873) 
         
GDP per capita 2.293*** -0.226 2.500*** -0.002 2.189** -0.231 2.197** -0.107 
 (0.858) (0.651) (0.884) (0.665) (0.912) (0.690) (0.848) (0.666) 
         
government consumption 0.128** 0.008 0.125* 0.016 0.151** 0.029 0.130** 0.024 
 (0.064) (0.039) (0.065) (0.039) (0.067) (0.046) (0.064) (0.039) 
R2 0.803 - 0.797 - 0.801 - 0.807 - 
Observations 1197 914 1159 877 1121 862 1192 912 
Number of countries 133 128 132 128 122 118 132 127 
Number of instruments - 121 - 115 - 117 - 113 
Hansen (p-value) - 0.575 - 0.528 - 0.525 - 0.453 
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.452 - 0.456 - 0.451 - 0.519 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 4.2.2). OLS regressions include a full set of country and year 
fixed effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimates include time fixed effects (country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The 
absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order lags, while GDP per capita and government 
consumption are considered as exogenous. The Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial 
correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% 
level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 4. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Adding covariates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
 absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.471*** - 0.483*** - 0.422*** - 0.437*** 
  (0.120)  (0.119)  (0.121)  (0.107) 
         
Dictatorship 1.576** 1.787** 1.083* 1.553** 1.502** 1.762** 1.286* 0.911 
 (0.716) (0.722) (0.624) (0.653) (0.609) (0.723) (0.667) (0.865) 
         
GDP per capita 0.150*** 0.018 0.144** 0.022 0.175*** 0.061 0.151*** 0.022 
 (0.056) (0.036) (0.058) (0.036) (0.060) (0.038) (0.056) (0.036) 
         
government consumption 2.313*** -0.409 2.502*** -0.416 2.356*** -0.763 2.243*** -0.437 
 (0.834) (0.510) (0.875) (0.555) (0.896) (0.525) (0.817) (0.515) 
         
growth rate 0.003 0.015 0.001 0.018* 0.005 0.022** 0.005 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) 
         
age dependency 0.082** -0.001 0.084** 0.005 0.075** -0.018 0.076** -0.017 
 (0.032) (0.023) (0.033) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.031) (0.025) 
         
population density 0.002*** 0.001* 0.003*** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.001** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
         
openness 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) 
R2 0.809 - 0.809 - 0.808 - 0.813 - 
Observations 1184 938 1182 937 1105 883 1179 935 
Number of countries 133 131 132 130 122 120 132 130 
Number of instruments - 129 - 121 - 127 - 125 
Hansen (p-value) - 0.535 - 0.373 - 0.633 - 0.383 
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.732 - 0.902 - 0/894 - 0.748 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). OLS regressions include a full set of country and year 
fixed effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimates include time fixed effects (country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The 
absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order lags, while GDP per capita, government 
consumption, growth rate, openness, population density, age dependency and military personnel are considered as exogenous. The Hansen 
statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for second-order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 5A. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Testing for outliers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.429*** - 0.454*** - 0.420*** - 0.397*** 
  (0.129)  (0.128)  (0.128)  (0.119) 
         
Dictatorship 1.436** 1.744** 1.106** 1.370** 1.290*** 1.848*** 1.328** 0.574 
 (0.631) (0.726) (0.506) (0.594) (0.490) (0.670) (0.552) (0.825) 
         
GDP per capita 0.075** 0.017 0.072** 0.016 0.112*** 0.042 0.079** 0.021 
 (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035) 
         
government consumption 1.720** 0.113 1.869** 0.136 1.367** -0.121 1.669** 0.331 
 (0.728) (0.550) (0.750) (0.589) (0.654) (0.582) (0.729) (0.521) 
R2 0.898 - 0.895 - 0.896 - 0.894 - 
Observations 973 938 926 887 930 913 990 934 
Number of countries 106 124 105 123 99 116 108 122 
Number of instruments - 125 - 116 - 123 - 121 
Hansen (p-value) - 0.593 - 0.404 - 0.772 - 0.725 
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.972 - 0.744 - 0.962 - 0.925 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). In all estimations we remove countries with standardized 
residuals above 2.576 or below -2.576. OLS regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM 
estimates include time fixed effects (country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship 
are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order lags, while GDP per capita and government consumption are considered as exogenous. The 
Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for second-
order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
Table 5B. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Excluding ex-Soviet countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.470*** - 0.481*** - 0.428*** - 0.418*** 
  (0.121)  (0.120)  (0.122)  (0.110) 
         
Dictatorship 1.811** 2.065*** 1.291** 1.865*** 1.813*** 2.465*** 1.820** 1.083 
 (0.699) (0.734) (0.612) (0.645) (0.602) (0.779) (0.773) (0.873) 
         
GDP per capita 0.186*** 0.033 0.185*** 0.034 0.215*** 0.058 0.185*** 0.028 
 (0.064) (0.043) (0.066) (0.043) (0.068) (0.046) (0.063) (0.042) 
         
government consumption 2.297*** -0.421 2.386*** -0.308 2.314** -1.002 2.240*** -0.346 
 (0.832) (0.630) (0.871) (0.658) (0.888) (0.653) (0.818) (0.598) 
R2 0.787 - 0.782 - 0.788 - 0.794 - 
Observations 1241 975 1185 920 1154 915 1233 971 
Number of countries 118 117 117 116 107 106 117 115 
Number of instruments - 126 - 118 - 123 - 122 
Hansen (p-value) - 0.607 - 0.397 - 0.813 - 0.460 
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.784 - 0.913 - 0.891 - 0.773 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). In all estimations we remove ex-Soviet union countries. 
OLS regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimates include time fixed effects 
(country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship are instrumented with first-order to 
fourth-order lags, while GDP per capita and government consumption are considered as exogenous. The Hansen statistic is a test of 
overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for second-order serial correlation in the 
first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes 
significance at 1% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 6A. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Instrumental variables approach (IV) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.556*** - 0.542*** - 0.548*** - 0.582*** 
  (0.057)  (0.060)  (0.057)  (0.046) 
         
Dictatorship 16.020*** 7.388** 16.475*** 8.066** 12.863*** 5.953** 10.222*** 4.399** 
 (5.573) (3.288) (5.968) (3.491) (4.856) (3.002) (3.095) (1.785) 
         
GDP per capita 2.105* 0.917* 2.682** 1.278** 2.379** 0.832 1.502* 0.449 
 (1.119) (0.543) (1.163) (0.648) (0.985) (0.513) (0.834) (0.412) 
         
government consumption 0.304*** 0.160** 0.300*** 0.160** 0.362*** 0.185** 0.206*** 0.094** 
 (0.110) (0.067) (0.110) (0.068) (0.121) (0.077) (0.079) (0.046) 
First-stage results 
Dictatorship_hat 0.462*** 0.398*** 0.533*** 0.452*** 0.603*** 0.500*** 0.834*** 0.716*** 
 (0.127) (0.119) (0.149) (0.137) (0.142) (0.132) (0.141) (0.128) 
         
First stage F-stat 13.26 11.27 12.85 10.89 18.12 14.31 34.25 31.35 
Underidentification test: Kleibergen-Paap rk 
LM statistic (p-value) 
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.005 
N 1320 1188 1258 1126 1233 1116 1312 1181 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). 2SLS are estimated using Dictatorship-hat as an 
instrument for Dictatorship. Dictatorship-hat is obtained from the probit estimation of Dictatorship on Dictatorship abroad, on the other controls 
and on time fixed effects. First stage estimates, the first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument and the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification 
test, under the null that the equation is underidentified, are reported in the lower part of the Table. Robust standard errors, clustered by country 
are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
 
 
 
Table 6B. Regime and fiscal redistribution: Alternative specification and IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV BMR BMR GWF GWF P&S P&S 
absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.473*** - 0.452*** - 0.443*** - 0.496*** 
  (0.063)  (0.068)  (0.082)  (0.048) 
         
Dictatorship 14.518** 8.736** 17.563** 11.304** 11.123** 7.617* 10.078*** 5.667*** 
 (6.290) (4.291) (7.215) (5.105) (5.193) (4.567) (3.321) (2.012) 
         
GDP per capita 2.719** 1.172 3.705*** 2.001* 2.639*** 0.852 1.904** 0.511 
 (1.078) (0.725) (1.272) (1.036) (0.966) (0.769) (0.862) (0.526) 
         
government consumption 0.231** 0.169** 0.212* 0.158* 0.275** 0.208** 0.176** 0.105* 
 (0.109) (0.080) (0.114) (0.086) (0.118) (0.105) (0.088) (0.058) 
First-stage results 
Dictatorship_hat 0.500*** 0.473*** 0.538*** 0.466*** 0.639*** 0.506*** 0.918*** 0.823*** 
 (0.163) (0.150) (0.171) (0.152) (0.169) (0.166) (0.164) (0.155) 
         
First stage F-stat 9.352 9.884 9.943 9.363 14.228 9.299 31.364 28.182 
Underidentification test: Kleibergen-
Paap rk LM statistic (p-value) 
0.005 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 
N 1196 1048 1159 1011 1120 985 1154 1008 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 4.2.2). 2SLS are estimated using Dictatorship-hat as an 
instrument for Dictatorship. Dictatorship-hat is obtained from the probit estimation of Dictatorship on Dictatorship abroad, on the other controls 
and on time fixed effects. First stage estimates, the first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument and the Kleibergen-Paap underidentification 
test, under the null that the equation is underidentified, are reported in the lower part of the Table. Robust standard errors, clustered by country 
are reported in parentheses. All regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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Table 7. The role of regime maturity on fiscal redistribution. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM OLS OLS GMM 
Dichotomous measure: CGV CGV CGV CGV CGV CGV CGV CGV CGV BMR BMR BMR GWF GWF GWF 
 absolute fiscal redistributionnt-1 - 0.611*** 0.508*** - 0.611*** 0.487*** - 0.609*** 0.511*** - 0.595*** 0.508*** - 0.594*** 0.451*** 
  (0.040) (0.105)  (0.040) (0.112)  (0.040) (0.108)  (0.042) (0.107)  (0.043) (0.104) 
                
Dictatorship 2.102** 0.967* 2.179** 2.619*** 1.234** 1.614** 2.087*** 1.335*** 1.662** 1.865*** 0.656* 2.534** 3.023*** 1.155** 2.781*** 
 (0.845) (0.594) (0.963) (0.785) (0.501) (0.753) (0.762) (0.489) (0.801) (0.686) (0.384) (1.073) (0.707) (0.461) (0.764) 
                
Dictatorship*age of the regime -0.143*** -0.049* -0.096** - - - - - - -0.142*** -0.057** -0.102** - - - 
 (0.041) (0.025) (0.038)       (0.039) (0.024) (0.043)    
                
age of the regime 0.132*** 0.049* 0.022 - - - - - - 0.131*** 0.057** 0.041 - - - 
 (0.038) (0.027) (0.047)       (0.037) (0.024) (0.045)    
                
Dictatorship*age of the regime_2 - - - -0.133*** -0.049** -0.075* - - - - - - -0.190*** -0.082*** -0.143*** 
    (0.039) (0.024) (0.042)       (0.042) (0.025) (0.043) 
                
age of the regime_2 - - - 0.084** 0.034 0.045 - - - - - - 0.133*** 0.057** 0.032 
    (0.039) (0.023) (0.042)       (0.038) (0.025) (0.043) 
                
Dictatorship*age of the regime_3 - - - - - - -0.165*** -0.086*** -0.105** - - - - - - 
       (0.047) (0.032) (0.049)       
                
age of the regime_3 - - - - - - 0.136*** 0.049* 0.056 - - - - - - 
       (0.038) (0.026) (0.041)       
                
GDP per capita 0.109* 0.058 0.003 0.128** 0.064* 0.005 0.107* 0.057 0.003 0.106* 0.055 0.008 0.116* 0.053 0.024 
 (0.059) (0.037) (0.034) (0.062) (0.037) (0.033) (0.058) (0.037) (0.034) (0.057) (0.038) (0.035) (0.060) (0.038) (0.034) 
                
government consumption 1.945** 0.670* -0.277 2.289*** 0.785* -0.130 1.993** 0.775* -0.112 1.886** 0.692 -0.148 2.265*** 0.730 -0.054 
 (0.758) (0.401) (0.594) (0.757) (0.430) (0.613) (0.764) (0.421) (0.573) (0.832) (0.420) (0.690) (0.783) (0.443) (0.683) 
R2 0.801 0.897 - 0.800 0.897 - 0.802 0.897 - 0.797 0.890 - 0.807 0.896 - 
Observations 1320 1188 1039 1320 1188 1039 1323 1188 1039 1261 1126 978 1233 1116 979 
Number of countries 133 132 132 133 132 132 133 132 132 132 131 131 122 121 121 
Number of instruments - - 128 - - 128 - - 128 - - 120 - - 125 
Hansen (p-value) - - 0.498 - - 0.518 - - 0.473 - - 0.399 - - 0.542 
AR(2) (p-value) - - 0.668 - - 0.736 - - 0.752 - - 0.812 - - 0.732 
Notes: Dependent variable: absolute fiscal redistribution (as defined in section 3.1.1). OLS regressions include a full set of country and year fixed effects. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimates include time fixed 
effects (country fixed effects eliminated by first-differencing). The absolute fiscal redistributiont-1 and Dictatorship are instrumented with first-order to fourth-order lags, while Dictatorship*age of the regime, age of the 
regime, GDP per capita, government consumption, are considered as exogenous. The Hansen statistic is a test of overidentifying restrictions, under the null that overidentifying restrictions are valid. The AR(2) is a test for 
second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level.  
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